The Secret Genesis of Area 51 Page 13

  In developing and prioritizing lists of targets, the committee members took into account the varying needs and interests of their parent organizations. Thus, the CIA representatives emphasized strategic intelligence: aircraft and munitions factories, power-generating complexes, nuclear establishments, roads, bridges and inland waterways. In contrast, the military services placed a heavier emphasis on order-of-battle data. The air force had a strong interest in gathering intelligence on the location of Soviet and East European airfields and radars. Although the committee members kept the interests of their services or agencies in mind, their awareness of the vital mission kept the level of cooperation high. Although occasionally impossible, the group always attempted to reach a consensus before issuing its recommendations. One or more agencies added a dissent to the recommendation of the committee.

  U–2 MISSION FILM HANDLING

  Developing the U-2 plane at Lockheed and flight testing it at the CIA’s Watertown Flight Test Facility in Area 51 were merely parts and stages of what Project AQUATONE entailed and required. While going through these stages, the CIA was preparing to deploy the U-2 and the three detachments to commence operational flights over the Soviet Union.

  On December 13, 1954, DCI Allen Dulles and his assistant, Richard Bissell, briefed Arthur C. Lundahl, the chief of the CIA’s Photo-Intelligence Division (PID), on Project AQUATONE. At DCI Dulles’s direction, Lundahl set in motion within his division a compartmentalized effort known as Project EQUINE to plan for the exploitation of overhead photography obtained from the U-2 project.

  In May 1955, the thirteen-member PID staff found the number of personnel too small to handle the expected flood of photographs expected from the U-2. The Directorate of Support (OS) authorized expanding the PID staff to forty-four persons.

  The Photo-Intelligence Division continued expanding in anticipation of large quantities of U-2 photography. It authorized the doubling of the number of staff in January 1956 when a new project known as HTAUTOMAT came into existence to exploit U-2 photography. The changes meant placing all the products from this project in the new control system.

  During the summer of 1956, the PID moved to larger quarters in the Stewart Building at Fifth Street and New York Avenue, NW, in Washington, D.C. By now, the PID photo interpreters were already working with U-2 photography following a series of missions in April 1956. The CIA’s U-2s photographed several U.S. installations considered analogous to high-priority Soviet installations. These preparations readied the PID for the mass of photography that they knew was coming when U-2 operations commenced in the summer of 1956.

  THE U–2 COVER STORY

  The rage and controversy over balloon flights continued into February 1956. Feeling the heat from Project GENETRIX and with the U-2 completing its final airworthiness tests, Richard Bissell and his staff realized the need for a cover story for overseas operations. While the CIA had used weather research for its cover at Area 51, now the CIA needed a plausible reason for deploying such an unusual-looking plane whose glider wings and odd landing gear were bound to attract curiosity.

  The CIA’s Photo-Intelligence Division grew to prepare for the expected flood of U-2 photographs. At the same time, Bissell decided the best cover for the deployment of the U-2 was that it was flying an ostensible mission of high-altitude weather research by the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics. Such a cover story, however, needed the approval of all concerned: air force intelligence, the Air Weather Service, the Third Air Force, the Seventh Air Division, the SAC U-2 project officer, the U.S. Air Force Headquarters project officer and NACA’s top official, Dr. Hugh Dryden. Before proceeding, Bissell consulted with the CIA Scientific Advisory Committee concerning the coverage plan.

  A committee of U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, CIA, NSA and State Department representatives created lists of priority targets for U-2 and other intelligence-gathering methods. The U-2 project used this list to draw up flight plans that enabled the committee to provide a detailed rationale for each plan for the president to consider as he decided whether to approve it.

  With approval from the NACA’s director, Hugh Dryden, Bissell’s team settled on the NACA high-altitude weather research cover story and arranged for the U-2s to take several weather photographs that later appeared in the press. By the end of March 1956, the project staff had worked out contingency plans for the loss of a U-2 over hostile territory. All press releases would use the weather research cover story that included the suspension of operations and at least an indication of the diplomatic action. Bissell approved these plans and ensured one final high-level look at the cover story on June 21, 1956.

  The cover story of the U-2 conducting weather research turned out to be not entirely bogus when the CIA sent a U-2 flown by Captain Meierdierck to Alaska to check out the high-altitude, high-latitude wind patterns. Meierdierck kept the aircraft on course despite high crosswinds by using the drift sight, a device allowing the pilot to look under the plane to check his course and determine any drift. A C-54 transport plane flew along under the U-2 in case he encountered any difficulty.

  The approval occurred the day after the first U-2 mission over Eastern Europe when Bissell met with General Goodpaster, James Killian and Edwin Land to discuss the pending overflights of the Soviet Union.

  Killian, as the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, headed a high-level and very secret study of the nation’s ability to withstand a surprise attack. While this project was still underway, he and Edwin Land persuaded President Eisenhower to support the development of a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2. Later, Killian headed Eisenhower’s Board of Consultants for Foreign Intelligence Activities, served as his cabinet-level science adviser and chaired the President’s Science Advisory Board. Killian would later serve as the chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under John F. Kennedy.

  U-2 pilot Francis Gary “Frank” Powers wearing his MC-3 partial-pressure suit, required above fifty thousand feet to prevent hypoxia. Central Intelligence Agency.

  Killian and Land disagreed with Bissell’s concept, including the proposed emergency procedures, and made a much bolder and more forthright proposal in the event of the loss of a U-2 over hostile territory. Rather than deny responsibility, the United States should state that it was conducting the overflights to guard against surprise attack.

  They all put the proposal aside for further thought, which it never received. Bissell’s weather research cover remained the basis for statements made after a loss. The CIA did not follow their advice, and the weather cover story led to the disaster following a May 1960 U-2 loss involving agency pilot Francis Gary “Frank” Powers.

  PREPARING FOR U–2 DETACHMENT A’S DEPLOYMENT

  TO ENGLAND

  The CIA was keen to deploy the spy planes in allied countries, and the United Kingdom was a willing partner. The agency was also keen on using British crews to “fool the Soviets” if a spy plane was captured or shot down.

  When the first group of U-2 drivers completed their training at Area 51, the CIA immediately deployed them to Royal Air Force Lakenheath to see how much of what the Russians had displayed the previous month was real.

  Each year during Russia’s May Day celebrations, the United States armed forces went on a worldwide alert while the Soviet Union paraded its latest armament and military might. Knowing the existence of Russia’s armament advances meant the United States needed detail data assessing strength. Were the Soviets displaying a demonstrator, or did they have several of whatever it was that they were displaying as an intimidating show of strength? Lockheed felt confident in the ability of the U-2 to fly, obtain information and avoid interception, and the CIA was equally eager to receive it.

  NACA announced that the USAF Air Weather Service would use a Lockheed-developed aircraft to study the weather and cosmic rays at altitudes up to fifty-five thousand feet. The CIA U-2 Detachment A was known publicly as the First Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisi
onal (WRSP). The detachment operated at Royal Air Force Lakenheath as a power projection extension of the CIA’s Watertown facility that was still training additional detachments at Area 51 for deployment elsewhere. The CIA was already preparing to deploy its second class, Detachment B, to Turkey and its third class, Detachment C, to Japan.

  Setting up the deployment venues required considerable planning, negotiations and logistics known to only a few. This top-secret activity allowed only those having a need-to-know in the loop. Advance parties deploying to the United Kingdom, Turkey and Japan included communications personnel at not only the host base but also other countries where the U-2 might fly. The same applied to fuels personnel, Lockheed maintenance personnel and security. Each received a top-secret classification.

  On April 30, 1956, the CIA airlifted two U-2A planes to Royal Air Force Lakenheath to await the arrival of the Detachment A personnel from Watertown.

  THE CIA’S FIRST STEALTH ATTEMPT:

  PROJECT RAINBOW, THE DIRTY BIRD

  Even before the U-2 became operational in June 1956, the CIA project officials were turning their thoughts to developing a stealth plane. The CIA estimated a short life expectancy for flying over the Soviet Union of between eighteen months and two years. This estimate proved optimistic once the Soviets demonstrated the capability of tracking and attempted to intercept the U-2 overflights. By August 1956, the U-2’s vulnerability concerned Richard Bissell to the point that he despaired of its ability to avoid destruction for six months, let alone two years.

  To extend the U-2’s useful operational life, project officials first attempted to reduce the aircraft’s vulnerability to detection by Soviet radars. In December 1956, Lockheed modified Article 341 using radar-absorbent materials for a series of radar cross-section tests called Project RAINBOW.

  Antiradar techniques relied on RCS of an object. Radar measured how much electromagnetic (EM) energy an object reflected, expressed as an area defined in square meters. The RCS of an object became a function of the object’s size, shape and materials that vary depending on the frequency of the EM energy. Long-distance search/acquisition radars use different frequencies than short-range fire control radars. Thus, it required a variety of techniques to protect the U-2.

  All parts of the aircraft created reflections—the fuselage, tail, wings, engine inlets and exhaust. The antiradar technique investigation fell into two categories. It either absorbed the radar energy or created reflections interfering with the reflections from the aircraft.

  Purcell’s first concept placed on the U-2’s fuselage an absorbent material that the Lincoln Lab team and Lockheed developers called “wallpaper.” This second approach, tested in early 1958, involved the use of plastic material containing a printed circuit design that absorbed radar pulses in the 65 to 85 MHz range. This material glued to parts of the U-2’s fuselage, nose and tail.

  Another firm, Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G), which was composed of MIT faculty members, tested the results under an air force contract to evaluate radars. EG&G operated a small testing facility at Area 51 for this purpose.

  Although Kelly Johnson had closely involved Purcell with the radar deception project since the early days, he did so reluctantly. Johnson disliked adding attachments that made his aircraft less airworthy. Johnson reflected his dislike of the antiradar attachments in the unofficial nickname “dirty birds” for the modified aircraft.

  After the Lockheed mechanics had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a Lockheed test pilot flew the plane over EG&G’s installation, little more than a series of tractor trailers containing instrumentation. EG&G technicians could thus record and evaluate the U-2’s radar return as it traversed a specific course over their facility. This method of testing radar-deceptive modifications proved both time consuming and dangerous.

  Lockheed strung another U-2, Article 344, with piano wire of varying dipole lengths between the nose and wings of the aircraft to reduce the radar signature. This method created extra drag, with a resultant penalty in range and altitude. The U-2 aircraft modified under Project RAINBOW earned the name “dirty bird” from the plane not being aerodynamically “clean.” This scheme called “trapeze” attempted to protect the engine inlets by running another wire diagonally from the nose to the slipper tank on each wing. To reduce low-frequency (70 MHz) reflections from the leading and trailing edges of the wings, they placed a wire parallel to and ahead of each wing’s leading edge and another parallel to and behind each wing’s trailing edge. They placed Ferrite beads on the wires to tune them to the expected frequencies. They called this technique “wires.”

  A fiberglass pole attached to each wingtip to anchor the outboard end of each wire. The poles provided anchor points ahead of and behind the wings. Each wire ran from the front end of each pole to the slipper tank (which projected in front of the wing) and from the slipper tank to the fuselage. Behind each wing, a wire ran from the back end of the fiberglass pole to the fuselage. The horizontal stabilizer was installed in a similar manner.

  Although the “trapeze” and “wallpaper” systems provided protection against some Soviet radars, the systems proved ineffective against radars operating below 65 MHz or above 85 MHz. Furthermore, both additions degraded the U-2’s performance. The weight and drag of “trapeze” reduced the aircraft’s operating ceiling 1,500 feet, and “wallpaper” acted as a thermal insulator and trapped heat inside the fuselage. Initially, the engineers applied the wallpaper to the upper and lower surfaces. However, after recognizing the heating problem, they applied it only to the lower half of the fuselage. The wires and trapeze installations caused increased drag that cost the U-2 almost a mile, 5,000 feet in altitude and 20 percent in range. The pilots lacked enthusiasm for flying the plane with its reduced performance. One of them likened it to being “wired like a guitar.”

  The fleet at this point consisted of nine aircraft and the six CIA pilots undergoing flight training at the site. The CIA and its air force support, the 4070th Support Wing (SAC) at Area 51, were at this point preparing for overseas deployment for three CIA detachments. This effort included everything needed for the restricted deployment of a tactical unit, including personnel, finance, base preparation, supply, transportation, fuel, camera film, aircraft maintenance, flight planning and clearance, security and countless other administrative details.

  CHAPTER 9

  THE OVERFLIGHT MISSIONS

  SPY FLIGHTS

  In October 1955, the Central Intelligence Agency had placed an order for an additional thirty-nine U-2 aircraft at the same time as the Strategic Air Command officers and enlisted men arrived at Area 51 to assist Lockheed in determining the operational capabilities of the U-2 and train the three pilot detachments. By January 1956, the U-2 had impressed the USAF enough that it decided to purchase thirty-one U-2s through the CIA for security in a transaction code named Project DRAGON LADY, using the aircraft’s nickname in the air force.

  On April 29, 1956, Detachment A, the first CIA crew, deployed to England as the First Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional (WRSP-1). The “provisional” designation gave the U-2 detachments greater security because provisional air force units did not have to report to higher headquarters. They first located to Mildenhall, England, but moved to Lakenheath shortly after that as Mildenhall’s hangar space proved inadequate.

  On May 7, 1956, Dr. Hugh Dryden, NACA director, announced the use of the U-2 as a research tool for the study of meteorological conditions. The announcement provided a cover for CIA operatives deploying from Watertown to the United Kingdom via air force. Their travel orders identified them as Department of the U.S. Air Force civilians of the Watertown WRSP. The CIA Detachment A pilots trained at Area 51 and deploying to the United Kingdom were Hervey Stockman, Marty Knutson, Carmine Vito, Glendon Dunaway, Carl Overstreet, Howard Carey and Jake Kratt.

  CIA pilot Carl Overstreet, Detachment A at Watertown, flew the first flight over denied territory in Eastern Europe. Carl Overstr
eet.

  Watertown Control Tower. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  Six days later, Watertown suffered its first fatality since the C-54 transport plane crash on Mount Charleston. The first fatality while flying the U-2 occurred on May 13, 1956, when test pilot Wilburn Rose, flying Article 345A, experienced trouble dropping his pogo (the outrigger wheel keeping the wings parallel to the ground) during takeoff. Once airborne, Rose made a low-level pass over the airstrip and shook loose the left pogo. He attempted a right turn to come back over the runway to shake loose the remaining pogo. The U-2 stalled and plunged to earth, disintegrating over a wide area.

  Four U-2s arrived in secrecy at Lakenheath on April 29, 1956, with the USAF releasing a cover story that the Lockheed-developed aircraft were planes flown by the USAF Air Weather Service to study the jet stream and cosmic rays. Unfortunately, the aircraft could not fly the recon missions over hostile territory for which it was developed and deployed until the fuel control problem was solved. Once the detachment made the fuel control fix, it began testing in the friendly skies of England. This soon ended with an incident between the CIA and the English government in which the United Kingdom ordered all CIA assets off English soil.

  Before flights could begin, the agreement with Prime Minister Anthony Eden began to falter as the Suez crisis loomed on the horizon. The CIA informed the British that they would deploy only one plane but sent four to the American base at Lakenheath. The CIA experienced two specific incidents that led it to transfer the U-2s to Wiesbaden in West Germany later in June.

  The first incident was the notorious “frogman” incident, when MI6 sent a retired naval commander, Lionel “Buster” Crabb, on a hazardous mission to examine the hulls of ships from a Soviet fleet that were visiting Portsmouth. Crabb’s headless body later washed up on the beach, causing huge embarrassment for Eden’s government, which was entertaining Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.