The Secret Genesis of Area 51 Page 15

  Nine days later, Watertown suffered the loss of Article 357 on December 19, 1956, resulting from pilot hypoxia. A small leak prematurely depleted the oxygen supply and impaired Robert J. Ericson’s judgment as he flew over Arizona. Because of his inability to act and keep track of his aircraft’s speed, the U-2 exceeded the placarded speed of 190 knots and disintegrated when it reached 270 knots. Ericson managed to jettison the canopy before the wind sucked him from the aircraft at twenty-eight thousand feet. His chute opened at fifteen thousand feet, and he landed without injury with the aircraft a total loss.

  USAF 4028 SQUADRON U–2 PILOTS ARRIVE

  AT AREA 51 FOR TRAINING

  In June 1957, the U.S. Air Force’s SAC, which wanted nothing to do with the U-2 at first, now needed more secrecy for its spy plane operations. SAC was concerned about its U-2 pilots assigned to what was originally the 508th Strategic Fighter Wing at Turner AFB, Georgia, flying the F-84 G. Deactivated in 1956, the 508th became the 4028th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (SRS), a component of the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Strategic Air Command. The air force activated the wing to fly the Lockheed U-2 spy planes out of Laughlin AFB, Texas.

  USAF pilots and support personnel of the 4028th Squadron arrived at Area 51, where the USAF pilots checked out and transferred to the USAF 4070th. The air force pilots trained at Area 51 were Jack Nole (squadron commander), Joe Jackson, Dick Nevett, Howard Cody, Dick “Gordo” Atkins, Ed Emerling, Mike Styer, Joe King, Ray Haupt, Warren “Goog” Boyd, Richard McGraw, John Campbell, Ken Alderman, Leo Smith, Richard “Steve” Heyser, Dick Leavitt, Bennie LaCombe, Bill “Skip” Allson, Tony Bevacqua and Jack “Curly” Graves.

  A second U-2 squadron, the 4029th SRS, received assignments in expectation of the CIA Project AQUATONE ending with the aircraft turned over to SAC. The transfer of U-2s from the CI never happened, and the 4029th SRS never acquired the U-2.

  The SAC relocated the 4080th from Turner AFB to Laughlin Air Force Base, near Del Rio, Texas, in early 1957. While the 4080th moved to the new location, the SAC instructor pilots at Area 51 were training a select cadre of pilots to fly the U.S. Air Force’s RB-57D replacement, the U-2 Dragon Lady.

  On March 20, 1956, U-2 #6696 crashed at Area 51. USAF pilot Tony Bevacqua survived. However, he wiped out the plane’s landing gear.

  In February 1957, Detachment A (WRSP) moved from Wiesbaden to Giebelstadt Air Base near Wurzburg, West Germany.

  On May 6, 1957, Bissell reported to the president concerning the progress of Project RAINBOW, saying that in operational missions, most incidents went undetected. President Eisenhower again authorized overflights of the Soviet Union, with the CIA promising Soviet detection or tracking of the U-2 as unlikely. At a meeting on May 6, 1957, with the president, Richard Bissell reported on the progress made in developing radar camouflage.

  USAF lieutenant colonel Tony Bevacqua trained in the U-2 at Area 51 and later flew the SR-71. He was the youngest of the early U-2 pilots. Tony Bevacqua.

  A U-2 plane landing on the Groom Lake bed with drag chute at the Area 51 NASA Beatty, Nevada radar site where the author worked sixty-five miles from Watertown using the same radar as used by the Soviet Union to track the U-2. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  A pilot entering U-2 at Area 51 for takeoff. Note the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics markings supporting the CIA’s cover story. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  A month later, during a Project RAINBOW test flight at Area 51, Article 341 suffered a flameout at seventy-two thousand feet due to airframe heat build-up caused by the “wallpaper” modification acting as insulation around the engine. Lockheed test pilot Robert Sieker’s pressure suit inflated, but his helmet faceplate failed, and he lost consciousness. The aircraft stalled at sixty-five thousand feet and entered a flat spin. At a low altitude, Sieker recovered enough to bail out. Without an ejection seat, Sieker died for lack of enough altitude for a safe manual egress. By the plane not having a pilot ejection system, the U-2’s tailplane struck and killed him in midair. The aircraft crashed in an area so remote that search teams needed four days to locate the wreckage. The extensive search attracted the attention of the press. In April 1957, a headline in the Chicago Daily Tribune read, “Secrecy Veils High-Altitude Research Jet; Lockheed U-2 Called Super Snooper.” The rescue responders found Sieker’s body near the wreck with his parachute partially deployed.

  The conclusion was that Project RAINBOW’s efforts to mask the radar image of the U-2 were ineffective and made the aircraft more vulnerable by adding extra weight that reduced its maximum altitude. Thus, the CIA canceled Project RAINBOW following Sieker’s death, mostly, however, because Soviet radar operators continued to find and track U-2s equipped with antiradar systems.

  Because of its large wingspan, an out-of-control U-2 tended to enter a classical flat spin before ground contact. This slow descent lessened the impact. Having no fire to occur after impact often made the remains of crashed U-2s salvageable, as was the case with the wreckage of Article 341. Kelly Johnson’s crew at the Skunk Works used the wreckage, along with spares and salvage parts of other crash U-2s, to produce another flyable airframe.

  Development Projects Staff noted the U-2’s ability to survive a crash in fair condition. The survivability after a crash became a consideration in its contingency plans for a loss over hostile territory. The thought of a plane surviving a crash meant an easy compromise of the weather research cover story because of the equipment on board the aircraft.

  The loss of one of Lockheed’s best test pilots, as well as the prototype “dirty bird” U-2, led Kelly Johnson to suggest that Lockheed should install a large boom at the radar test facility. Using the boom, which could lift entire airframes fifty feet in the air, technicians could change the airframe’s attitude and run radar tests almost continuously without having to fuel and fly the plane.

  By the summer of 1957, testing of the radar-deception system was complete, and in July the first “dirty bird” (DB) arrived at Detachment B, an operational detachment, and flew the first mission of a U-2 known as a “Covered Wagon” on July 21, 1957. The CIA flew nine flights of the test aircraft before deeming the system ineffective and ending its use in May 1958.

  On June 11, 1957, the 4028th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron commander, Colonel Nole, led the first of two three-ship U-2 formations from Area 51 to their new home at Laughlin, Texas, for operational duty. Both RB-57s and U-2s graced the West Texas skies until the RB-57s’ retirement in April 1960. The U.S. Air Force’s U-2 eventually became the United States’ sole manned-airborne reconnaissance platform, and most of them were stationed at Laughlin Air Force Base.

  U–2 DETACHMENT C MOVES TO EIELSON AFB, ALASKA

  Detachment C moved to Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska during the summer of 1957. On June 8, 1957, a U-2 took off from Eielson AFB to conduct the first intentional overflight of the Soviet Union since December 1956. This mission broke new ground in two respects: it was the first overflight conducted from American soil and the first by the new Detachment C.

  Detachment C, the third group of pilots to complete training in the autumn of 1956, officially identified as the Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional-3. The third detachment needed a new base because of Area 51 becoming the training site for pilots flying the twenty-nine U-2s purchased by the U.S. Air Force. The CIA decided Edwards AFB was the best location for Detachment C and began looking for bases there.

  Even without the arrival of the U.S. Air Force pilots, Detachment C could not have stayed much longer. In June 1957, the entire facility evacuated, with all remaining CIA personnel, materiel and aircraft transferring to Edwards AFB in California as Detachment G.

  By the fall of 1957, only months after the first deployment of a dirty bird, it became obvious to Bissell and the scientific team that the treatments had only a marginal effect on tracking and they needed a new aircraft with antiradar features to escape detection.

  CHAPTER 10

  BACK AT T
HE RANCH

  FROM DREAMLAND TO GHOST TOWN

  In May 1957, Atomic Energy Commission radiological safety officer Charles Weaver, Oliver R. Placak and Melvin W. Carter participated in two meetings at Area 51, where Weaver revealed and discussed the film Atomic Tests in Nevada. The Atomic Energy Commission briefed Watertown personnel on nuclear testing activities, radiation safety and the possibility of radiation hazards from the test series. Before leaving Watertown, the Atomic Energy Commission men met with two air force officers, Colonel Jack Nole and Colonel Schilling, and the CIA commander, Richard Newton, to discuss arrangements for radiation monitors to visit the airbase whenever anticipating the fallout in the Watertown area.

  Even before the departure of the U-2s, the Atomic Energy Commission used the Area 51 facility as a test bed for its nuclear tests. In June 1957, two minor atomic blasts occurred in Yucca Flat as CIA pilot classes finished training and the U-2 test operation moved to North Base at Edwards AFB, California, leaving Watertown a virtual ghost town in caretaker status with a site manager, security and minimal complement of personnel present.

  For the next few years, the remaining Watertown residents learned to live with their atomic neighbor, evacuating the facility during nuclear tests and returning to repair the damage caused by the atomic detonations. At Watertown, the workers wrapped chicken wire around the fluorescent lights in the mess hall and hangars to catch any bulbs shaken out by the underground tests or the sonic booms from the planes.

  On one occasion, Watertown received notification of an underground atomic test in the range to the west. About nine o’clock in the morning, residents felt the earth quake like a shake of the test. A short time later, they learned of the underground test venting and the prevailing winds blowing the radiation toward the CIA’s Groom Lake facility.

  The Lockheed transport planes evacuated the non-critical people, and everyone else assembled in the metal mess hall for possible evacuation. The authorities informed them of the planes returning from Burbank to evacuate them and instructed them to remain inside. The mess hall remained open twenty-four hours a day with free food.

  The Atomic Energy Commission conducted Operation PLUMBBOB as a series of nuclear tests between May 28 and October 7, 1957, following Project 57, the biggest, longest and most controversial test series in the continental United States. The operation consisted of twenty-nine explosions with twenty-one laboratories and government agencies involved.

  Outside the Atomic Proving Grounds, the Atomic Energy Commission used the CIA facility as a test bed for monitoring and measuring for radiation exposure inside the evacuated buildings and vehicles. The commission used the Groom Lake facility to study the ability of various materials to shield against fallout. In effect, Watertown was a laboratory to determine the shielding qualities of typical building materials found in any average American small town.

  The fallout wasn’t the only unwelcome visitor to the inactive facility. In July 1957, security at the CIA facility detained a civilian pilot named Edward K. Current Jr., a Douglas Aircraft Company employee who was flying a cross-country training flight when he became lost and ran low on fuel. He landed at Groom Lake, where the security officers held him overnight for questioning. The Nevada Test Organization (NTO) security officials reported the incident to the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), which administered the air closure over the test site. The following day, the NTO Office of Test Information issued a press release to the news media describing the incident.

  In another incident, a flight of three F-105 Thunderchiefs, led by British exchange pilot Anthony “Bugs” Bendell, was on a practice nuclear weapon delivery sortie eighty miles north of Nellis Air Force Base when one aircraft experienced an oil pressure malfunction. One F-105 returned to Nellis, while Bendell led the stricken craft to the airfield at Groom Lake. After making a pass over the field with no response to distress calls, Bendell advised the student pilot to land. At this point, two F-101 Voodoos intercepted Bendell and forced him to land.

  At Langley, Bissell and his air force assistant, Colonel Jack Gibbs, continued the overseas U-2 deployments, expecting at any time to lose a U-2 to a Soviet missile. They knew it was simply a matter of time before the Soviet Union would advance its air defenses to take down a U-2. After having a taste of stealth with RAINBOW, they discussed the aircraft and materials manufacturers, as well as various laboratories, to understand what materials and designs could replace the U-2. On December 4, 1957, Bissell conducted a meeting where he summed up the various techniques:

  Engines and other metal structures inside the aircraft required shielding by reflection.

  Some structural members that are impossible to shield required transparency by using plastic and eliminating metal components inside.

  Protecting against S-band and X-band radars required shaping the exterior of the aircraft to reflect the energy away from the radar unit.

  To reduce reflections exposed edges would require “softening” to have a gradual change in the impedance of the structure.

  Meanwhile, in May 1957, Eisenhower again authorized overflights over certain important Soviet missile and atomic facilities. He continued to authorize each flight, examining maps and sometimes making changes to the flight plan. By 1957, one of the European units was based at Giebelstadt and another at the far eastern unit at the Naval Air Facility in Atsugi, Japan.

  Soviet overflights resumed with the CIA flying Operation Soft Touch missions over Russia and China. An August mission provided the first photographs of the Baikonur Cosmodrome near Tyuratam that the CIA was unaware of until then. Other flights examined the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site and the Saryshagan missile test site. These occurred at a time when the U.S. president sought to avoid angering the Soviets as he worked to achieve a nuclear test ban.

  The Soviets were by now trying to shoot down even U-2 flights that never entered the Soviet airspace. The details in their diplomatic protests showed that Soviet radar operators could effectively track the aircraft.

  By now, the Soviets had developed their overflight aircraft, flying variants of the Yak-25, which, in addition to photographing various parts of the world through the early 1960s, also acted as a target for the new MiG-19 and MiG-21 interceptors to practice for the U-2.

  Lockheed attempted to hide the aircraft by painting it in a blue-black color called Sea Blue to blend in against the darkness of space. The weight of the paint robbed the U-2 of 1,500 feet altitude. The CIA countered this and the Soviet threat by powering the aircraft with the more powerful J75-P13 engine, which increased its maximum altitude an additional 2,500 feet, to 74,600 feet.

  THE MISSILE GAP

  In August 1957, the U.S. had watched as Russia launched the first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). In October that year, the CIA woke up one morning to the beeping sound of the Sputnik 1 in orbit. It became worse. The United States watched Russia place the first man in space. Then, it launched the first woman into space and then the first three cosmonauts into space. The first spacecraft to hit the moon followed.

  The United States knows now that this all happened thanks to the anonymous chief designer Sergei Pavlovich Korolev, head of the OKB-1 experimental design bureau #1 and Russia’s most senior rocket scientist. The United States had no counterpart in its space exploration program.

  In its effort to beat the United States to place a man on the moon, the Russians realized the lack of infrastructure to design a gargantuan engine. Whereas the United States planned using five rocket engines to power its launch vehicle, the Russians designed their N-1 rocket to launch using thirty lesser-powered engines. These engines used a full cycle design that the United States considered too risky.

  The successful launch of Sputnik 1 on October 4, 1957, gave credence to Soviet claims about the progress of its ICBM program. The surprise launch began the Sputnik crisis in the United States. In December 1958, Khrushchev boasted that a Soviet missile could deliver a five-megaton warhead eight thousand miles. The Unit
ed States feared the Soviets’ SS-6 Sapwood missile program. The fear that they might have a three-to-one temporary advantage in ICBMs during the early 1960s caused widespread concern in the United States about the existence of a “missile gap.” The Russians had better rocket engines capable of doing things that the United States could not do. The space race superiority was a wonderful period for the Russians.

  Detachment A, which had earlier deployed to England on a PCS basis (without dependents or household effects) in anticipation of a full tour in England, encountered unforeseen events that necessitated a hurried move to Germany. Before the year was out, the detachment moved to another German base before returning to the ZI after eighteen months overseas.

  This experience led to the decision of detachments deploying TDY (temporary duty) rather than PCS (permanent change of station) given the inability to predict the length of stay at a given base. General Cabell approved this change of policy in August 1956 when Detachment B deployed TDY to Adana, Turkey, without dependents or household effects. In March l957, Detachment C deployed to Japan on the same basis.

  On September 25, 1957, the project director wrote to the deputy director, support (DD/S), to advise him of the desired change in policy. With the prospect of continuing Project AQUATONE operations overseas at least through the calendar year 1958, he suggested they make plans to have the dependents of project personnel join them at overseas locations. He pointed how the concept to date centered on maintaining a high degree of mobility for personnel and equipment.

  The events of the past eighteen months had shown the political impact of having an AQUATONE unit within the borders of a friendly country less than anticipated, and this consequently shifted them to a fixed-base concept with a forward staging capability. A fixed-base operation made them consistent with the secrecy concerned of including dependents for unit personnel. The concept included the CIA’s contract pilots, some of them married with dependents wanting to join them overseas.