The Secret Genesis of Area 51 Read online

  Workers arriving at Watertown for security check following a shuttle flight. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  Arriving workers at Watertown lining up to pass through security. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  Early on, the security concern focused on cleared personnel discussing classified matters where those lacking a need-to-know might overhear them. About the only other concern in this area regarded mishandling of classified material. Secret procurement of the aircraft components proved to be more challenging. Even the aircraft’s onboard equipment involved the CIA security planners. For example, Johnson ordered altimeters from the Kollman Instrument with instructions for calibrating the devices to eighty thousand feet. Johnson’s choice raised eyebrows at Kollman because its instruments only went to forty-five thousand feet. The CIA’s security personnel briefed several Kollman officials and produced a cover story saying it planned to use the altimeter for experimental rocket planes.

  In May 1955, while the CIA dealt with security concerns and recruiting pilots, Osmund J. Ritland, one of the first air force officers assigned to Project OILSTONE, began coordinating air force activities in the U-2 program with Richard Bissell. A month later, Ritland became Bissell’s deputy, although Air Force Chief of Staff Twining did not approve this assignment until the day after.

  Air force officer Lieutenant Colonel Leo P. Geary, using the U.S. Air Force Inspector General’s Office as a cover, joined the program in June 1955 and remained as a project officer until August 1966, longer than any of the other project managers. As an air force colonel (later brigadier general), he was James Cunningham’s air force counterpart in the U-2 program. He was instrumental in diverting engines from other air force projects for use in the U-2 and served as the focal point to provide a high degree of air force continuity for all Defense Department support to the U-2 programs during his eleven years with the overhead reconnaissance projects.

  BUILDING THE CIA FLIGHT TEST FACILITY AT AREA 51

  The dry lakebed provided a great landing strip except when it rained enough for the lake to collect rainwater runoff from the surrounding mountains. To solve this problem, the project managers provided the project a paved runway to allow testing during these times.

  On May 4, 1955, a survey team arrived at Groom Lake and laid out a five-thousand-foot (1,500-meter) north–south runway on the southwest corner of the lakebed and designated a site for a base support facility. Area 51, initially known as Site II, consisted of little more than a few shelters, workshops and trailer homes in which to house its small team.

  The CIA’s facility requirements soon changed, however, calling for a permanent facility nearly 300 percent larger than Johnson’s original design. Before the Groom Lake selection, Johnson had estimated the construction of a larger Site I facility would cost $450,000. His estimate for building the same facility at Site II (Groom Lake) was $832,000.

  The CIA maintained its cover during the construction of the Groom Lake flight test facility by using secret funds to pay the C.L.J. Construction Firm—C.L.J. being the initials of Kelly Johnson—by placing in Johnson’s mailbox blank envelopes filled with cash for all work (runways, hangars, quarters, water wells, sewers and so on).

  By July 1955, the CIA’s flight test facility was ready for occupancy, and the agency, air force and Lockheed personnel began moving in under the CIA’s commander, Richard A. “Dick” Newton, USMCR (Ret). Newton would serve from 1955 to 1956 and Landon McConnell from 1956 to 1957.

  By now, the CIA’s fledgling Groom Lake facility had two dirt landing strips, one approximately five thousand feet and one seven thousand feet long, both scraped into the barren desert floor on the east side of the lake. At this same time, Earnest Williams, a REECo employee, drilled a well that provided a limited water supply; however, trouble with the well still required trucking in water.

  Workers at Area 51 laying out laundry for pickup at Area 51 in 1956. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  The facility contained three hangars, a control tower and rudimentary accommodations for test personnel. The facility’s few amenities included a movie theater and a volleyball court in addition to a mess hall and fuel storage tanks. Many today tend to refer to the Groom Lake operating facility in Area 51 as a base, as in an air force base. During the CIA stewardship, Groom Lake remained a flight test facility with no official name or designation as an air base.

  Bissell’s plan for the project was to have the Lockheed test pilots train some air force instructor pilots to fly the U-2 and for these instructor pilots (IPs) to train the pilots selected to fly U-2 missions for the CIA.

  Earlier, in February 1955, Colonel Ritland had sought a direct line to General John S. Mills, the air force deputy chief of staff, personnel, to recruit the best candidates available. He tried to expedite the paperwork required to transfer them to the project separately from that of the regular military assignees to other CIA duty. The liaison officer in the Pentagon would furnish him the candidate files for review by senior project officers. This worked well until General Mills encountered the U.S. Air Force’s reluctance to release so many extraordinary men from critical categories. The signing of a joint agreement in August 1955 solved the problem. However, these delays had a sharp effect on the training, equipping and deployment. The U.S. Air Force’s reluctance to meet the aerial reconnaissance needs justified the decision to have the CIA take the lead in training and deploying the U-2 detachments.

  Watertown flight line at sunset. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  Night view of maintenance on U-2 at Watertown. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  Lieutenant General Emmett “Rosy” O’Donnell, the U.S. Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for personnel, authorized the use of air force pilots and provided considerable assistance in the search for pilots meeting the high standards established by the CIA and the U.S. Air Force. Most of the air force pilots, the instructor pilots and those sheep dipped into the CIA alike had trained at Turner Air Force Base in Georgia.

  The U.S. Air Force attached its assigned project personnel to the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group Headquarters Command, where a special unit of the Military Personnel Division handling their records approached the selectees through a form letter that described the proposed assignment to the CIA as a sensitive activity overseas without their dependents. The personnel division requested their personal history statement for use in a security office investigation and granted preliminary approval for administrative processing.

  While the CIA won the bitter battle with General LeMay and SAC over control of Project AQUATONE, General LeMay won the right to name the staff and the military people who would run the flying part of the program. He chose Colonel Yancey to command the training wing at Area 51 out of March Air Force Base in California.

  Even before the recruiting effort was underway, the U.S. Air Force and the CIA developed a pilot training program. Under the terms of the OILSTONE agreement between the CIA and the U.S. Air Force, responsibility for pilot training lay with Colonel William F. Yancey.

  The CIA screened and selected the mission pilots from SAC F-84 pilots with long-range navigation training. The CIA organized three squadrons, and General LeMay chose the commanders. Colonel McCoy commanded Detachment A, Colonel Perry commanded Detachment B and Colonel Stan Berrli commanded Detachment C.

  Each candidate received orders to Washington and completed the entry-on-duty processing, including physical and psychological examination, security briefing and voluntary participation in a polygraph interview. Once the candidate received a final security clearance, the individual entered duty status and received a briefing on his assignment. Only after reporting in at March Air Force Base in Riverside, California, did the pilots selected meet the other personnel making up this group.

  A mobile car following a U-2 across Groom Lake at Watertown. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  Stress showing on the face of a U-2 pilot following an eight-hour flight. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  A U
SAF sergeant suit technician assisting a U-2 pilot out of his partial-pressure suit following a flight. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  The first few months of this procedure saw a moderately high rate of washouts of military personnel for various reasons when subjected to agency tests. Despite efforts made to explain the necessity for it and to minimize the reaction to it, the CIA could do little to make this type of examination more palatable to senior air force officers. The career air force officers found it patently difficult to accustom themselves to civilian command with stringent security control over all their activities and movements. Only a moderate number of problem cases came from the screening to give trouble later.

  While the recruitment of military personnel was underway, Richard Newton of the CIA took command of Area 51. At the same time, on July 24, less than eight months after the go-ahead call from Trevor Gardner, Kelly Johnson readied the first aircraft, known as Article 341, for delivery to the “Paradise Ranch” site. Lockheed completed the final inspection, flutter and vibration tests and control proof tests and disassembled the aircraft for transport to the Groom Lake remote test facility for taxi and first flight.

  Virtually all of the U-2s were delivered from Burbank to Area 51 by air force Douglas C-124 Globemasters. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  Three days later, Lockheed transported the first U-2 prototype number 101, disassembled and wrapped in cloth, to the Watertown Groom Lake facility from a small Lockheed factory at Oildale, California, on board a C-124 transport plane. The C-124 pilots delivering the plane did not know their destination. Their instructions were to fly (at night) to a certain point on the California-Nevada border and follow radio directions to their unknown landing site. The cargo plane landed on the Groom Lake dry bed rather than the runway after base commander Richard Newton expressed his doubts to Kelly Johnson concerning the new asphalt runway supporting the weight of the loaded C-124. The CIA security personnel required the crew to turn in their regular IDs upon arrival and use aliases while at the Groom Lake facility.

  The Lockheed U-2 #001 arrived at Area 51 to commence flight tests under the FAA designation N308X. It was a lightweight, unusual-looking plane with an eighty-foot wingspan resembling a glider. Among other equipment, it came armed with two telescopic-lens cameras with extraordinary capabilities, including a high-resolution lens capable of focusing on a newspaper headline over the shoulder of a person on the ground from an altitude of fifteen miles. Johnson’s aircraft provided the unprecedented potential for espionage and was vital for investigating the “bomber” and “missile” gaps threatening the U.S. national security.

  C-124 unloading U-2 at Watertown. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  At Groom Lake, Lockheed mechanics spent the next six days readying the craft for its maiden flight. Colonel Allman T. Culbertson from the U.S. Air Force’s Office of the Director of Research and Development pointed out to Lieutenant Colonel Geary that before “Kelly’s Angel” could take to the air, it needed an air force designator.

  The two officers looked through the aircraft designator handbook to see their options and decided they could not call the project aircraft a bomber, fighter or transport plane. Not wanting anyone to know the CIA intended to use the new plane for reconnaissance, Geary and Culbertson decided to place it in the utility aircraft category along with the only two utility aircraft on the books, a U-1 and a U-3. Thus, Johnson’s CL-282 design, called the “angel” by the Lockheed test pilots, the “article” by the CIA and the “Dragon Lady” by the air force, became simply the U-2. The CIA referred to all the U-2s as articles. The difficulty experienced by the pilots flying the U-2 led to it being called the “Dragon Lady” because the aircraft was extremely unforgiving on pilot ineptitude or incompetence.

  U-2 planes being constructed at Lockheed’s low-profile Oildale facility near Bakersfield, California. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  Lockheed’s U-2 production facility at Oildale, California. Lockheed.

  A U-2 on the runway at Area 51 with pogos installed to support the wings during takeoff. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  Six days after the U-2 Article 341 arrived, Lockheed test pilot Tony LeVier piloted the unofficial maiden U-2 flight during a taxi test. The CIA and Lockheed intended LeVier to conduct only a high-speed taxi test. The sailplane-like wings were so efficient that the aircraft jumped into the air at 70 knots (81 miles per hour, 130 kilometers per hour), amazing LeVier, who, as he later said, had no intentions whatsoever of flying. The lake bed had no markings. The lack of markings made it difficult for LeVier to judge the distance to the ground. The brakes proved too weak, causing the U-2 to bounce once before it stopped rolling. He tried the ailerons only to discover the plane airborne. The transition to flight occurred so smoothly he did not notice.

  Levier cut the power and contacted the ground in a left bank of ten degrees in a hard landing that blew both tires and caught the brakes on fire, only to bounce back into the air. He brought the plane back down for a second landing. He applied the brakes, with little effect. The aircraft rolled for a long distance before coming to a stop.

  Lockheed test pilot Tony LeVier flew the first test flight of the U-2 at Watertown. area51specialprojects.com.

  Bissell, Cunningham and Johnson saw the aircraft fall and bounce. Leaping into a jeep, they rushed to the plane and saw the brakes were on fire. The ground crew followed in radio trucks carrying extinguishers. They signaled to LeVier to climb out and then used fire extinguishers to put out the fire before it damaged the airframe.

  A pilot entering a U-2 for high flight. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  Thus, Lockheed test pilot Tony LeVier was the first to learn the U-2 had a mind of its own when it came to flying. At a debriefing session that followed, LeVier complained about the poor performance of the brakes and the absence of markings on the runway.

  The prototype U-2 suffered only minor damage: blown tires, a leaking oleo strut, a pneumatic air–oil hydraulic shock absorber on the landing gear, on the undercarriage and damaged brakes. This unplanned flight foretold the airworthiness of the U-2.

  Taxi trials continued for one more day. The CIA knew now that the U-2 loved to fly and refused to land. At low speeds, it remained in ground effect and glided effortlessly above the runway for great distances.

  Little did the CIA know that the plane’s design, expected to fly two years, would still be flying today, more than half a century later. In eight months and under budget, the CIA produced at Area 51 the most capable and reliable high-altitude intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platform ever, even compared to any system flying today—manned or unmanned.

  Three days following the U-2 taxi trials, on August 4, 1955, LeVier piloted the U-2 at Groom Lake on its first official flight, flying it to eight thousand feet in a rainstorm. It flew beautifully. Having only two landing wheels, it landed like a bicycle. LeVier wanted to touch the rear wheel down first. However, Kelly Johnson insisted on him landing the plane by touching the nose wheel down first.

  U-2 assembly in a hangar at Watertown. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  LeVier disagreed with this approach, believing the U-2 would bounce if he attempted to touch down on the forward gear first. LeVier took the aircraft up to eight thousand feet, leveled off and cycled the landing gear up and down. He tested the flaps and the plane’s stability and control systems before making his first landing approach. As the U-2 settled down, the forward landing gear touched the runway, and the plane skipped and bounced into the air. LeVier made a second attempt to land front wheels first, and again the plane bounded into the air. Kelly Johnson watched from a chase plane and gave a constant stream of instructions as LeVier made three more unsuccessful landing attempts.

  With the light fading and a thunderstorm fast approaching from the mountains to the west, LeVier made one last approach using the method he first advocated: letting the aircraft touch on its rear wheel first. This time the U-2 made a near-perfect landing ten minutes before
the thunderstorm dumped a rare two inches of rain, flooding the dry lakebed and making the airstrip unusable.

  U-2 assembly in a hangar at Watertown. CIA via TD Barnes Collection.

  Legend had it that LeVier climbed from the cockpit while giving Johnson a “one-fingered” salute for almost getting him killed with his insistence on a nose-first landing. Johnson supposedly returned the “onefingered” salute and yelled, “You, too.” The story spread among the pilots, and the plane itself became known as the “You, too,” or U-2. Again, this was another name legend derived at the CIA’s mythical facility with many names.

  Now with the first problems in flying and landing the U-2 worked out, Kelly Johnson scheduled the “official” first flight for August 8, 1955. This time, outsiders present included Richard Bissell, Colonel Osmond Ritland, Richard Homer and Garrison Norton.

  LeVier, using the call sign ANGEL 1, made the first real flight in Article 341 with Bob Matye flying chase in a C-47 and Kelly Johnson on board as an observer.

  The U-2 ascended to thirty-two thousand feet and performed well, meeting Kelly Johnson’s eight-month deadline. LeVier made an additional nineteen flights in Article 341 before moving on to other Lockheed flight test programs in early September. This first phase of U-2 testing explored the craft’s stall envelope, took the aircraft’s maximum stress limit (2.5 gs) and explored its speed potential. LeVier was soon flying the aircraft at its maximum speed of Mach 0.85.